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EauITY-DxvoRCE AND Si!PARATION-WIFE's AGREEMENT NOT TO CLAIM
ALIMONY As DEFENSE TO LATER Ac::noN FoR AimEARs-In a prior· action against
H for separate maintenance, W was awarded custody of their children and
monthly maintenance of $50. She later lived openly with X, adopted his name,
and had a child by him. Some of the children left W during their minority and
lived with H. The maintenance payments were discontinued when W told H
that she would no longer receive them. Four years after payments ceased, W unsuccessfully moved the federal district court to adjudge H guilty of contempt
and to award her a money judgment for the past-due installments. Held, judgment for H affirmed. Franklin v. Franklin~ (App. D.C. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 12.
Pursuant to statutory authority,1 to an express provision in the decree,2 or
to their inherent remedial authority,3 equity courts almost universally modify alimony or separate maintenance orders upon a proper showing by either party. An
order may be modified or vacated in a proper proceeding, or it may terminate automatically upon death of either party, divorce with an alimony award, or, in some

12 VEBNIEB, AMERICAN FAMILY LA.ws §§106, 132 (divorce), §§139, 145 (separate
maintenance) (Supp. 1938).
2 17 AM. Jun., Divorce & Separation, §644.
3 42 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, §626; 17 AM. Jun., Divorce & Separation, §644; 27 AM.
Jun., Husband and Wife, §§402, 428 (separate maintenance); 127 A.L.R, 741 (1940).
Authorities conflict as to the power to modify an alimony decree in an absolute divorce; 71
A.L.R. 723, 726 (1931). But see Golderos v. Golderos, 169 Va. 496, 194 S.E. 706 (1938),
holding that the absence of an express reservation prevented later modification of the divorce
decree.
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jurisdictions, resumption of cohabitation.4 Absent one of these circumstances,
failure to comply with the order is hazardous even though changed conditions may
justify modification or vacation by the court, because the majority of courts hold
that the installments become vested property rights as they accrue and the court
has no power to modify its decree as to these past-due installments. 5 Even these
courts, however, may enforce a contract between the parties to change the amount
of the maintenance award, although this results in a retroactive modification of
the original order. Such agreements do not bind the court, and are approved only
if they are fair and free from fraud, make reasonable provision for the wife, and
have valuable consideration.6 On this basis the court in the principal case could
not find the elements of contract because of the absence of promissory undertakings and mutual assent; H's expenditures in support of the children who were
living with him were not the agreed exchange for W's waiver of maintenance
payments. Nor could the court deny relief on the ground of laches, as a much
longer lapse of time than four years, with other prejudicial circumstances, is generally necessary in alimony cases.7 Instead, the court overruled its prior decisions
that it lacked power to remit accrued installments. 8 The merits of this assertion by
the court of unrestricted power to control maintenance payments must, however,
be balanced against the need to protect the remedial weapons of the wife. Where
the equity court retains this measure of control, the decree will not be considered
final; hence it is not required to be enforced by a foreign court under the full
4 42 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, §626(2); 27 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife, §428; 40
A.L.R. 1227, 1239 (1926). Contra, Washburn v. Washburn, 137 Misc. 658, 244 N.Y.S.
34 (1930); Mcilroy v. Mcilroy, 208 Mass. 458, 94 N.E. 696 (1911) (resumption of cohabitation). Cf. ANN. CAs. (1912A) 937.
5 Greer v. Greer, IIO Colo. 92, 130 P. (2d) 1050 (1942); Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206
Ia. 1075, 221 N.W. 837 (1928); 94 A.L.R. 331 (1935); 27 AM. Jun., Husband and Wife,
§428; Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16-17, 30 S.Ct. 682 (1910). Apparently most jurisdictions draw no substantial distinction between alimony decrees in limited divorce cases and
separate maintenance orders in this respect. See Knight v. Knight, 211 S.C. 25, 43 S.E. (2d)
610 (1947). But cf. Rochellev. Rochelle, 235 Ala. 526, 179 S. 825 (1938); Ostrin v. Posner,
127 Misc. 313, 215 N.Y.S. 259 (1925). Statutes may expressly provide for retroactive modification, e.g. N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §1170, amended by N.Y. Amendment Laws (1948), c. 212; or prohibit retroactive modification, e.g., 5 Ore. Comp. Laws
Ann. (Supp. 1943) 63-215 (f); or may be sufficiently broad that the court may construe them
to permit retroactive modification, as in Woehler v. Woehler, 107 Mont. 69, 81 P. (2d) 344
(1938); and Duffy v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Misc. 332, 19 A. (2d) 236 (1941). Most statutory
language is so general as to permit either construction.
6 Gray v. Gray, 149 Misc. 273, 267 N.Y.S. 95 (1932); Meyers v. Meyers, (Mo. App.
1929) 22 S.W. (2d) 853; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, §238(c) and cases cited. See also 166 A.L.R.
372 (1947). The agreement may not be specifically enforceable, however, Apfelbaum v.
Apfelbaum, 111 N.J. Eq. 529, 162 A. 543 (1932).
7 137 A.L.R. 884, 894 (1942). Again, courts do not distinguish between divorce and
separation decrees.
8 Principal case at 13, overruling three previous decisions of the court. Either result is
possible under the District of Columbia statute, which provides that "•.. the case shall still
be considered open for any future orders.•.." 16 D.C. Code (1940) §413. See 16 D.C. Code
(1940) §415. A few other courts have reached this result, u<ually on the basis of estoppel or
acquiescence. De Blaquiere v. De Blaquiere, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 322, 162 Eng. Rep. 1173 (1830);
Kumlin v. Kumlin, 200 Minn. 26, 273 N.W. 253 (1937); 137 A.L.R. 884, 897 (1942).
Cf. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 233 Ala. 125, 170 S. 198 (1936).
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faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 9 If the wife cannot sue the husband
on the decree wherever she finds him, she may be unable to enforce her right to
support in any way. Moreover, as in the principal case, the husband can generally
get prospective relief from the court which granted the decree if sufficient grounds
exist for ceasing payment.10 It is easy to understand the motives for the decision in
the principal case, but the probable effect in forfeiting the extraterritorial sanction
of the full faith and credit clause for alimony or separate maintenance decrees
makes it at least questionable. ~1

Melvin]. Spencer

9 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682 (1910); Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412,
221 S.W. 1066 (1920). Courts disagree as to whether they will enforce such a decree on
considerations of comity, 41 A.L.R. 1419, 1421 (1926).
10 Adultery is a sufficient ground for termination of the separate maintenance decree in ·
some jurisdictions. 42 C.J.S. 272 (1944); 27 AM, Jun., Husband and Wife, §408; 26 AM.
Jun., Husband and Wife, §340.
11 In alimony cases Missouri also adopted the view of the principal case in Francis v.
Francis, 192 Mo. App. 710, 179 S.W. 975 (1915), but returned to the majority rule in
Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (1920), on this public policy ground.

